Harvard Business School 9-585-

Rev. April 16, 1997

Professor John A. Quelch prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or

ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to

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British Airways

On Sunday, April 10, 1983, a 6-minute commercial for British Airways (BA) was aired in the

middle of a weekend talk show. The commercial included a statement by Lord King, BA’s chairman,

and highlighted BA’s achievements during the previous two years. The commercial also included the

inaugural showing of a 90-second advertisement known as Manhattan Landing. This advertisement

and three others formed the basis of an unprecedented 31 million advertising campaign designed to

promote BA’s brand name and corporate image worldwide.^1

######## British Airways

By many criteria, BA was the largest international airline in the world. In 1982-83, BA carried

11.7 million passengers on 130,728 international departureswell ahead of Air France which carried

9.6 million international passengers. In terms of international passenger miles, BA’s 37 billion a year

comfortably surpassed Pan Am. BA flew to 89 cities in 62 countries outside the United Kingdom

during 1982-83. Forty-two percent of BA sales were made in the United Kingdom, 25% in the rest of

Europe, and 33% in the rest of the world.

BA was a state-owned enterprise, formed as a result of the 1972 merger of British European

Airways and British Overseas Airways Corporation. The economies of scale in the work force which

many expected from the merger were slow to materialize. Partly as a result, BA continued to record

annual losses throughout the 1970s. BA’s financial performance was aggravated by increases in the

price of fuel oil stemming from the 1973-74 energy crisis. In addition, greater price competition

especially on transatlantic routesresulted from the deregulation of international air fares. An

example of this trend was the advent of the low-price, no-frills Laker Airways Skytrain service on the

lucrative transatlantic route in 1979.

The election of a Conservative government in the United Kingdom in 1979 prompted a

change in approach toward the management of BA. The new administration was determined to

reduce the losses which almost all state enterprises showed each year and, in many cases, to restore

these enterprises to private ownership. A new chairman, Sir John (later Lord) King, was appointed to

head BA in 1980. He initiated programs to improve BA’s products and services along with a hiring

freeze and an early retirement program to reduce the size of the work force. By March 1983, BA’s

(^1) BA’s fiscal year ran from April 1 to March 30. At the time of the case, ,1 was equivalent to about $1.50. This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

585-014 British Airways

work force had been reduced to 37,500 people from 59,000 just three years earlier. In addition, BA

showed a profit in 1982-83 for the first time in 10 years, compared with a 500 million loss in 1981-

(see Exhibit 1 ).

Industry observers believed that BA would have to sustain this improved performance if

stock was to be offered to private investors by the end of 1984. So the programs of product and

service improvement continued, together with further labor cutbacks. Recently introduced Boeing

757s were added to the fleet in 1983, a quality control division was established, and the U.K. Super

Shuttle was introduced.^2

The turnaround in performance was recognized when BA received the 1983 Airline of the

Year award, based on a survey of business travelers. However, although costs were reduced and the

quality of service improved, BA’s public image remained weak. Along with other nationalized

industries, BA continued to share a reputation for inefficiency and incompetence. Accordingly, Lord

King stated that one of his main objectives was "to make the airline proud again."

######## Advertising during the 1970s

During the 1970s, BA country managers had revenue responsibility for BA’s marketing and

operations in their individual markets. The advertising agencies with which they dealt were

appointed by BA headquarters. Foote, Cone & Belding (FCB) had held the BA account in the United

Kingdom since 1947, and as a result, many country managers outside the United Kingdom also used

FCB subsidiaries or affiliates.

In 1978, British Airways appointed FCB as its worldwide agency, meaning that all country

managers had to deal with the FCB subsidiaries or affiliates in their countries. The purpose was to

achieve a more favorable commission rate from FCB rather than to increase centralized control of

advertising content around the world. Indeed, in the United States, where the BA account moved

from Campbell Ewald to FCB, the BA advertising theme built around Robert Morley and the theme of

customer care was retained intact since it had only recently been launched (see Exhibit 2 ). Although

the Morley campaign was considered a success, building as it did on Britain’s favorable reputation in

the United States for old-fashioned hospitality, the campaign nevertheless caused problems for BA

executives in the United States. In the words of one, "It overpromised on customer service; every

time something went wrong, my phone would ring off the hook."

Prior to the appointment of FCB as the worldwide agency, BA country managers were not

required to submit their proposed advertising copy to headquarters for approval. There were certain

loosely defined guidelines governing the presentation of the BA logo, but beyond that, local country

managers and their agencies were free to determine their own advertising copy. Major advertising

campaign concepts did, however, require headquarters approval. Following the appointment of FCB

as the worldwide agency, this procedure changed. Each December, BA country managers would

submit to headquarters requests for advertising funds for the following fiscal year as part of the

annual planning process. Once the commercial director at headquarters had allocated these funds,

each country manager would then brief the local FCB agency or affiliate and develop the advertising

copy for the coming year. Country managers in the larger markets would submit their advertising

copy to the commercial director in London more as a courtesy, while the smaller countries were

required to submit their proposed copy for approval. Headquarters required changes in about 5% of

cases, typically on the grounds that the advertising overstated claims or was inconsistent with the

image BA wished to project.

(^2) Four shuttles operated between London and Manchester, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Belfast. Tickets could be purchased in advance or on board and flights typically left every hour during the day. This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

British Airways 585-

Whatever the intent, the result of this process was inconsistent advertising from one country

to another. First, campaigns varied across markets. The Robert Morley campaign was considered

suitable only for the United States. And a recently developed United Kingdom campaign in which a

flight attendant emphasized the patriotism of flying the national flag carrier could likewise not be

extended to other countries. Second, commercials and advertising copy promoting the same service

or concept were developed in different markets. There were limited procedures within BA and the

agency for ensuring that the best ideas developed in one market were transferred to other markets.

Finally, the quality of FCB’s subsidiaries and affiliates varied significantly from one country to

another, aggravating the problem of inconsistency.

BA advertising during this period, like the advertising for most other major airlines, tried to

persuade consumers to choose BA on the basis of product feature advantages. Rather than

attempting to build the corporate image, BA advertising emphasized superiority and differentiation

in scheduling, punctuality, equipment, pricing, seating, catering, and/or in-flight entertainment.

Advertising typically focused on particular products such as the air shuttle, BA tour packages, route

schedules and classes of service (such as Club).^3 The impact on sales of many of these product-

specific and tactical advertising efforts could be directly measured. In addition, the commercial

director responsible for BA advertising worldwide insisted that a price appear in all advertisements

in all media. Frequently, BA advertisements compared the prices of BA services to those of

competitors. The commercial director’s insistence on including price information in each

advertisement frequently caused problems. For example, in the United States, the APEX fare^4 to

London from New York differed from that from Boston or Chicago, so different commercials had to

be aired in each city.

The 1982-83 advertising budget of 19 million was allocated almost entirely to advertising of

a tactical or promotional nature. Only the patriotic "Looking Up" campaign in the United Kingdom

made any effort to develop BA’s corporate image. About 65% of the 1982-83 budget was allocated by

the commercial director to the International Services Division (ISD); about 30% to the European

Services Division (ESD), and about 5% to the Gatwick Division, which handled BA air tours, package

holidays, and cargo business in the United Kingdom.^5 BA advertising expenditures during 1982-

for 14 representative countries are listed in Exhibit 3 together with other comparative market

information.

######## Saatchi & Saatchi Appointed

In October 1982, the Saatchi & Saatchi (S&S) advertising agency was asked by Lord King to

explore the possibility of developing an advertising campaign which would bolster BA’s image and

which could be used on a worldwide basis. S&S was one of the first agencies to espouse the concept

of global brands. In newspaper advertisements such as that shown in Exhibit 4 , S&S argued that

demographic and cultural trends, and, therefore, the basic factors underlying consumer tastes and

preferences were converging. In addition, S&S noted a growing spillover of media across national

borders, fueled by the development of satellite television. Given these trends and the increasing level

of international travel, S&S viewed the concept of global brands employing the same advertising

themes worldwide as increasingly plausible.

Following its appointment, S&S set up a Central Policy Unit (CPU) to plan and coordinate

work on the worldwide BA account. This unit included a director aided by specialists in research,

planning, and budgeting. Over a two-month period, the CPU developed into a complete account

team, one section handling advertising in the United Kingdom and Europe, the second handling

(^3) The BA equivalent of Business Class. (^4) Advance purchase excursion fare. (^5) The geographical coverage of the ISD and ESD mirrored that of the old BOAC and BEA. This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

585-014 British Airways

advertising in the rest of the world. The account team included a creative group and a senior media

director with international experience.

After winning the BA account, S&S had to resign its business with British Caledonian,

Britain’s principal private airline. This business amounted to 3.5 million in media billings in 1982.

Three S&S offices in other countries had to resign competitive airline accounts. Of the 62 countries in

which BA had country managers, S&S had wholly owned agencies in 20 and partly owned agencies

in 17. In the remaining countries, S&S retained a local agency, in some cases an FCB affiliate, to

continue to handle the BA account. S&S did not permit its overseas affiliates to collect commissions

on locally placed media billings as compensation for working on the local BA account. Rather each

affiliate received a fee or share of the commission for the services it performed from S&S

headquarters in London. S&S billed BA headquarters for all of its services worldwide, except in the

case of markets such as India where legal restrictions inhibited currency transactions of this nature.

The relationship between S&S affiliates and headquarters was closer than it had been when

FCB handled the BA account. A BA country manager would work with the local S&S agency to

develop an advertising copy proposal which would be submitted to BA headquarters in London on a

standard briefing form. The BA headquarters advertising manager would then decide whether to

approach the S&S account team in London to develop a finished advertisement to be sent back to the

BA country manager. Under this system, neither BA country managers nor their local agencies were

involved in the design of advertising copy except in terms of working requests, stating objectives, and

suggesting content. According to S&S executives, the frequency with which certain types of

advertisements were requested meant that it might, in the future, be possible to develop standard "ad

mats." BA country managers and their local agencies would simply fill in the relevant destination

and fare information on these ad mats and would not have to submit them to London for approval.

The system described above varied somewhat from one country to another. BA country

managers and their local agencies in the five most important long-haul markets (United States,

Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Japan) had slightly more autonomy than their counterparts in

less important markets. Although all advertising had to be approved in London prior to use, finished

copy could be developed in the local market by the local agency in conjunction with the BA country

manager.

An early example of how commercials might be developed for use in more than one country

under the S&S approach occurred at the end of 1982. The U.S. country manager developed an

advertising proposal for the "Inbound" line of package tours from the United States to the United

Kingdom. Members of the U.S. agency creative team and BA executives from New York came to

London to develop proposed scripts for the commercials. These were then approved by the U.S.

country manager, but the commercials were shot in the United Kingdom so that British scenery could

be included. These same commercials were subsequently used in South Africa and the Caribbean

with different voiceovers; these countries’ budgets could not be stretched to fund their independent

production of television commercials of this quality.

Meanwhile, organization changes occurred at BA. Following the appointment of Colin

Marshall as managing director in February 1983, the three divisions were replaced by eight

geographic market centers which handled BA’s basic passenger business and three additional

business units handling cargo, air charter services and package tours. These eleven profit centers

reported to Marshall through Jim Harris, marketing director.^6 Harris also supervised a central

marketing services staff involved with strategic planning, advertising, market analysis, and market

research. An advertising manager who reported to the general manager for marketing services was

responsible for agency relations and for the review and implementation of advertising by BA country

(^6) The marketing director performed the tasks previously undertaken by the commercial director. The latter title was no longer used. This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

British Airways 585-

managers. One of his assistants handled relations with the United Kingdom and European country

managers; a second handled relations with the remaining country managers.

Under this new organization, BA country managers submitted their annual marketing plans,

including proposed advertising and promotion budgets, to the appropriate market center manager in

London. The country managers were informed in 1983 that their future budget proposals would

have to provide detailed objectives and research support. In particular, country managers would

have to forecast how their overall sales and profits would be impacted by particular advertising and

promotion programs. The total advertising budget would be allocated among the country managers

according to the quality of the proposals and according to which markets were designated for

maintenance or development spending levels.

A country manager who required additional advertising funds during the fiscal year or

wished to offer special consumer price deals and travel agency commissions above the norm

applicable to the countries in his/her market center could apply to the market center manager in

London. The marketing director held a reserve fund to deal with such contingencies, and also

reserved the right to reallocate funds designated for one market to another during the fiscal year if,

for example, foreign currency fluctuations altered the attractiveness of one market versus another as a

holiday destination.

######## Development of the Concept Campaign

The S&S creative team was charged with developing an advertising campaign which would

restore BA’s image and prestige, and not necessarily by focusing on specific BA products, services,

and price promotions. The agency described the qualities of the ideal advertising concept for the

campaign: "It had to be simple and single-minded, dramatic and break new ground, instantly

understood throughout the world, visual rather than verbal, long-lasting, likable, and confident."

S&S executives believed that the type of product-feature-based advertising used by BA and

traditional in the airline industry could not satisfy these objectives. First, an airline competitor could

easily match any product-based claim BA might make. Second, such advertising only impacted that

portion of the target market who viewed the benefit on which superiority was claimed (e.g., seat

width) to be particularly important. The agency believed that only a brand concept campaign could

focus consumers on the permanent and essential characteristics of BA which transcended changes in

product, competitive activity, and other market variables.

The agency established five objectives for the worldwide BA concept campaign:

To project BA as the worldwide leader in air travel.
To establish BA as the world’s most successful airline.
To demonstrate the superiority of BA products.
To add value in the eyes of passengers across the whole range of BA products.
To develop a distinctive, contemporary, and fashionable style for the airline.

The account team had the benefit of consumer research which S&S had conducted in July

1982 with business and pleasure travelers in the United Kingdom, United States, France, Germany,

and Hong Kong to understand better attitudes toward, and preferences for, particular airlines. Based

on these data, S&S executives concluded that consumers perceived most major airlines as similar on a

wide array of dimensions. To the extent differences existed, BA was viewed as a large, experienced

airline using modern equipment. However, BA was rated poorly on friendliness, in-flight service,

value for money, and punctuality. In addition, BA’s image varied widely among markets; it was

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585-014 British Airways

good in the United States, neutral in Germany, but weak in France and Hong Kong. The name of the

airline and the lack of a strong image meant that consumer perceptions of its characteristics were

often a reflection of their perceptions of Britain as a country.^7 BA was often the carrier of second

choice after a consumer’s national flag airline, particularly among consumers taking a vacation trip to

the United Kingdom.

By November 1982, BA had developed in rough form a series of eleven television

commercials around the theme "The world’s favorite airline." The lead commercial of the concept

campaign, known as "Manhattan Landing,"^8 was to be 90 seconds long with no voiceover during the

first 40 seconds and with a total of only 35 words of announcer copy. It would show the island of

Manhattan rotating slowly through the sky across the Atlantic to London accompanied after 70

seconds by the statement that "every year, we fly more people across the Atlantic than the entire

population of Manhattan."^9 Ten other commercials known as the "preference" series showed

individuals (from an Ingrid Bergman look-alike in Casablanca to members of a U.S. football team)

receiving airline tickets and being disappointed to find that they were not booked on BA.

International celebrities such as Peter O’Toole, Omar Sharif and Joan Collins were shown at the end of

each commercial checking in for a BA flight. The announcer copy for all the preference commercials

was identical. Storyboards for Manhattan Landing and one of the preference commercials are

presented as Exhibits 5 and 6. The intention was to air these commercials in all BA markets

worldwide with changes only in the voiceovers.

In November, the BA board of directors approved production of Manhattan Landing and

three of the preference commercials. Production costs for these four commercials were estimated at

1 million.^10 S&S executives were asked to have the finished commercials ready for launch by April

1983, a very tight schedule given the complexity of the executions.

While the commercials were being produced, members of the S&S account team and BA

headquarters advertising executives traveled to each BA market. Their purpose was to introduce and

explain the worldwide concept campaign at meetings attended by each BA country manager and

his/her staff along with representatives of the local BA advertising agency. These visits occurred

during January and February 1983 and involved the presentation of storyboards rather than finished

commercials.

######## Reactions to the Concept Campaign

Reactions varied. The concept campaign was well-received in the United States, although the

BA country manager was concerned about its dissimilarity from the existing Robert Morley

campaign, which emphasized traditional British values. In India, there was some question as to

whether Manhattan would hold any significance for the local audience. In other countries, including

former British colonies, the claim "the world’s favorite airline" was met with reactions such as "you

must be joking!" The claim seemed to lack credibility particularly in those markets where BA was in a

relatively weak share position versus the national flag carrier. In other markets, such as France and

(^7) In addition, some BA executives believed that BA was perceived more favorably in countries that had previously been served by BOAC than those previously served by BEA. (^8) The Manhattan Landing commercial was originally conceived as a corporate advertisement to be shown exclusively in the United Kingdom to support BA’s privatization effort. When it became clear that the offering of BA stock to the public would be delayed until at least the end of 1984, it was decided to include it in the worldwide concept campaign. (^9) BA flew 1.5 million passengers across the Atlantic to the United Kingdom in 1982-83, more than Pan Am and TWA combined. The population of Manhattan was 1.4 million. (^10) Recent BA television commercials had cost about 75,000 to produce. This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

British Airways 585-

Kuwait, only the state-owned airline was allowed to advertise on television, so the BA concept

commercials could be used only in cinema advertising.

Questions about the proposed campaign were also raised by S&S affiliates. Since the parent

agency had built its reputation on the importance of developing clear-cut positioning concepts, the

proposed commercials seemed inconsistent with the philosophy of the agency. Even though the

preference commercials were each planned to be 60 seconds long, some agency executives argued

that they were too cluttered and tried to achieve too many objectives.

In particular, the 90-second Manhattan Landing commercial was greeted by some with

amazement. One agency executive commented: "The net impact of three 30-second commercials

would surely be greater." The South African agency requested a 60-second version of the commercial

because the South African Broadcasting Company would not sell a 90-second piece of commercial

time. S&S management had to decide whether to accommodate this request.

Other BA country managers were concerned that the concept campaign would reduce the

funds available for local tactical advertising presenting fare and schedule information specific to their

particular markets. One BA manager, after seeing the proposed campaign commented, "Where are

the smiling girls, the free cocktails, and the planes taking off into the sunset?" Another asked, "Will

this campaign sell seats?" The BA proposal to spend half of the worldwide 1983-84 advertising

budget of 26 million on the concept campaign meant that the amount available for local tactical

advertising would fall from 19 million to 12 million. Preliminary BA concept and tactical

advertising budgets for 14 representative countries are presented in Exhibit 7. Partly in response to

the country managers’ concerns, the total budget was raised to 31 million in April when BA’s 1982-

operating results were known. Forty percent of the new budget was allocated to the worldwide

concept campaign, 60% to tactical local market advertising.

Some country managers complained that their control over advertising would be reduced

and that a corporate advertising expenditure in which they had no say would be charged against

their profits. BA headquarters executives responded that while the country managers were required

in 1983-84 to spend 40% of their budgets against the concept campaign, they were free to determine

the media allocation of concept campaign expenditures in their markets and the weight of exposures

given to each of the four executions. They were also free to spend more than 40% of their budgets on

the concept campaign if they wished.

Despite such concessions, the Japanese country manager remained adamantly opposed to

adopting the concept campaign. On the London-Tokyo route, Japan Air Lines held a 60% market

share compared to BA’s 40%. Of the traffic on the route, 80% originated in Japan, and 80% of those on

board BA flights were tourists on package tours. The Japanese country manager rejected the concept

campaign as inappropriate. He presented market research evidence showing that his main challenge

was selling Britain as a destination rather than developing consumer preference for BA.

######## The April 10 Launch

Some S&S executives had hoped that BA would commit almost all of its 1983-84 advertising

budget to the concept campaign. However, local marketing requirements highlighted by the country

managers necessitated the continuation of tactical advertising, albeit at a reduced rate. The logo and

slogan from the concept campaign were, however, to be incorporated in BA tactical advertising and

the requirement that tactical creative copy be developed by S&S in London ensured that this would

be the case.

Despite all the reservations they had encountered, BA and S&S executives in London felt that

they had sold the campaign effectively to most of the BA country managers. Thus, an invitation was

mailed by Lord King to all BA employees in the United Kingdom to view the introductory television

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585-014 British Airways

commercial on April 10. Videocassette copies of this 6-minute commercial were mailed to BA offices

around the world. BA country managers invited representatives of the travel industry to attend

preview parties timed to coincide with the launch of the new concept campaign in their respective

countries.

The campaign was launched in the United Kingdom on April 10 as planned and, within two

weeks, was being aired in 20 countries. For two reasons, few country managers adopted a "wait and

see" attitude. First, the marketing of package tours for the summer season had already started (in the

northern hemisphere). Second, many country managers had exhausted their 1982-83 advertising

budgets by the end of January, with the result that consumers had not been exposed to any BA

advertising for several months.

######## The Concept Campaign in the United States

The United States was one of the countries in which the concept campaign was launched on

April 10. The BA country manager welcomed the campaign since consumer research indicated that

BA’s size was not recognized by most consumers in a country where, for many, bigger meant better.

When asked to name the airline that carried the most passengers to the United Kingdom, more

respondents cited Pan Am and TWA than BA. The results of the survey, conducted in New York and

Los Angeles in March 1983, also showed:

Unaided awareness of BA as a leading international carrier was 41% in New York (Pan Am – 85%; TWA – 74%) and 33% in Los Angeles (Pan Am – 76%; TWA
- 74%).
Unaided recall of BA advertising was 21% in New York and 17% in Los Angeles.
BA was mentioned as one of the three largest airlines in the world by 15% of New York respondents and 13% in Los Angeles.
BA was mentioned as one of the three best international carriers by 11% of New

York respondents and 9% in Los Angeles.

The BA country manager viewed the concept campaign as a means of addressing some of

these deficiencies. Since the claim "the world’s favorite airline" was well-documented, the U.S.

country manager did not anticipate a legal challenge from Eastern Airlines which used the slogan

"America’s favorite way to fly."

The media plan for the concept campaign ( Exhibit 8 ) called for a combination of spot

television in BA’s six key gateway cities, national network television, and commercials on Cable News

Network. The Manhattan Landing commercial was scheduled to be shown four times on national

network television. Management argued that this would provide BA with exposure in important

markets near gateway cities and would also excite the BA sales force and the travel industry. Four

exposures were deemed sufficient given the commercial’s creative originality. They would reach 45%

of the U.S. adult population an average of 1.2 times.

The budget for the concept campaign from April to June was $4 million. Nevertheless,

during this period, the BA country manager expected to be outspent by Pan Am and TWA in BA

gateway cities. In 1982-83, Pan Am and TWA advertising expenditures for domestic and

international routes combined approximated $65 million and $50 million respectively.

In addition to the concept campaign, the BA country manager had also developed a business

campaign and a leisure campaign for 1983-84:

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British Airways 585-

Business Campaign Recent consumer research indicated that Pan Am and TWA were perceived

as superior to BA on attributes important to business flyers. BA advertising directed at business

people had not significantly improved these perceptions (BA and TWA advertisements targeting the

business traveler are presented as Exhibits 9 and 10 ). However, the perceptions of BA among its

business passengers were much more positive than those of non-BA passengers, indicating significant

customer satisfaction. BA’s U.S. marketing director concluded that BA had a substantial opportunity

to increase its share of the transatlantic business travel market.

The following three objectives were established for the 1983-84 business advertising

campaign:

Increase awareness of the name "Super Club" as a service comparable to (or better than) TWA’s Ambassador Class and Pan Am’s Clipper Class.
Increase the business traveler’s awareness and knowledge of the features of all three BA business travel services: Concorde, First Class, and Super Club.
Maximize the "halo" benefits of BA’s Concorde in marketing efforts directed at First Class and Super Club consumers.

The media schedule for the business campaign ( Exhibit 11 ) emphasized national magazines

and both national and local newspapers. Magazines were selected which had higher than average

percentages of readers in BA’s gateway cities. Newspapers with strong business sections were given

preference.

Leisure Campaign BA advertising targeting the leisure traveler had traditionally focused on BA’s

hotel, car rental, and package tour bargains. Despite high consumer recall of these "bolt-on" features,

consumer perception research indicated that BA lagged its competitors on attributes such as "good

value for money" and "good deal for leisure travelers." Accordingly, BA’s advertising agency

suggested that these bolt-on features be subordinated to the objective of creating a general impression

of value for money through advertising an airfare bargain along with BA’s expertise in things British.

The objectives for the 1983 summer campaign were:

Capitalize on BA’s reputation as a marketer of good vacation buys, reinforcing consumers’ willingness to arrange their European vacations with BA.
Promote awareness of and demand for BA’s summer transatlantic leisure- oriented fare of $549 roundtrip.

A BA summer campaign newspaper advertisement and a Pan Am advertisement targeting

the leisure traveler are reproduced as Exhibits 12 and 13. BA executives were planning on

developing print advertisements targeting the leisure market which would mirror the commercials in

the concept campaign if it proved successful.

The media schedule for the leisure campaign ( Exhibit 14 ) emphasized spot television and the

travel sections of local newspapers. Their late advertising deadlines meant that fare changes could be

quickly communicated to consumers.

######## Conclusion

As BA and S&S executives implemented the worldwide concept campaign and the biggest

advertising effort in BA history, they contemplated several issues. First, if awareness, recall, and sales

data indicated that the campaign was not having the desired impact in a particular market, would BA

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585-014 British Airways

headquarters permit the country manager to curtail the concept campaign? Second, if the campaign

was successful, how long could it be sustained before becoming "tired"?

A third issue was how competitive airlines would respond to the BA concept campaign.

Believing that the major carriers wished to avoid a new worldwide competitive price war, BA

executives believed that they would adopt a "wait and see" attitude. However, market share losses

would make retaliation inevitable, particularly in markets like the Far East where Singapore Airlines

and Cathay Pacific held high market shares and were extremely price-competitive. In such a

situation, should BA steadfastly continue to spend 40% of its advertising budget on the concept

campaign or should some of these funds be diverted to tactical advertising in particular local

markets? The probability of such diversion of funds depended partly on the emerging profit picture

during the fiscal year and partly on the level of unspent tactical advertising funds. It was, therefore,

more likely to become an issue toward the end of the fiscal year.

A further related issue was the appropriate budget split between the concept campaign and

tactical advertising in 1984-85. Some BA executives argued that if the concept campaign were

successful, it would be possible to reduce expenditures on the campaign to a maintenance level and

proportionately restore tactical advertising. They maintained that such a move would shift control of

the advertising budget from S&S back to BA. But agency executives argued strongly that the concept

campaign should be centrally administered from BA headquarters and that expenditures on the

campaign in each country should not, unlike tactical advertising, be regarded as a route operating

cost. They also argued that the concept campaign was essential to BA’s long-term effectiveness and

should not be sacrificed to short-term operational requirements.

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British Airways 585-

Exhibit 1 British Airways: Income Statement, April 1, 1982-March 31, 1983

Sales Revenues Million

Passengers on scheduled services 1,

Passengers on charter services 86

Freight 151

Mail 36

Ground arrangements for package tours 100

Expenses

Staff 593

Aircraft 101

Engineering 107

Operations 863

Marketing 205

Accommodation, ground transport and administration 159

Recoveries (158)

Ground arrangements for package tours 102

Operating surplus 172

Plus Operating surplus from nonairline activities

a
18

Plus Other income

b
20

210

Less Cost of capital borrowings and tax 149

Profits before extraordinary items 51

Plus Profit on sale of subsidiaries 26

Profit 77

a Including BA helicopters, BAAC, and IAC.

b Investments in other companies, interest earned on cash deposits, surplus from disposal of assets.

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

Exhibit 2 Robert Morley Campaign Magazine Advertisement

585-014 British Airways

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

British Airways 585-

Exhibit 3 Comparative Data for Fourteen Markets

% BA 1982-
Worldwide
Passenger
Revenues

1982-
Advertising
Expenditures
( '000)

Principal BA
Competitors

BA's Market
Share Versus
Principal
Competitor

%Business/
% Pleasure
BA
Passengers

United Kingdom 42% 6,223 British Caledonian

a
Similar 42/
Pan American

U.S.A. 14 5,773 Pan American Lower 26/

TWA

Germany 5 228 Lufthansa Lower 50/

British Caledonian

Australia 3 967 Qantas Similar 6/

Singapore Airlines

France 3 325 Air France Lower 52/

British Caledonian

Japan 3 393 Japan Airlines Lower 30/

Cathay Pacific Airways

Gulf States 2 134 Gulf Air Lower 12/

Kuwait Airlines

Canada 2 991 Air Canada Lower 11/

Wardair

South Africa 2 331 South African Airways Lower 15/

TAP (Air Portugal)

Italy 2 145 Alitalia Lower 50/

Dan Air

New Zealand 1 125 Air New Zealand Similar 3/

Singapore Airlines

Egypt .5 53 Egyptair Similar 26/

Air France

Zimbabwe .4 41 Air Zimbabwe Higher 8/

KLM

Trinidad .3 77 BWIA Higher 7/

a These are BA’s principal competitors on international routes. BA’s main competitors on domestic United

Kingdom routes were British Midland Airways and Dan Air.

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

585-014 -14-

(continued)

a
The columns in this newspaper ad have been reformatted to fit an 8

1 /

11 page.

Exhibit 4

Saatchi & Saatchi Newspaper Advertisement

THE OPPORTUNITY FOR WORLD BRANDS.

Nowadays, life for branded goods manufacturers is
not as straightforward as it once was.

Many years ago manufacturers first recognised that
advertising could provide a key foundation for theirbusiness growth.

They realised that while their customer was the re-
tailer, the actual consumer was the public; that adver-tising could enable them to build a solid position intheir market by building the goodwill of their realcustomerthe consumer.

They also saw that if they, the manufacturers, did
something to move their goods from retailers shelvesas quickly as they arrived on them, trade would bebrisk and everyone would be satisfied.

Thus the manufacturer became the advertiser of
branded products, the retailer became the purveyorof brands and advertising became a conspicuousfeature of the age.

This happy cycle produced brands of startling en-
durance and longevity, as the table below shows.US BRAND LEADER

CURRENTPOSITION

SWIFT PREMIUM, BACON

NO.

EASTMAN-KODAK, CAMERAS

NO.

WRIGLEY, CHEWING GUM

NO.

NABISCO, BUSCUITS

NO.

EVEREADY, BATTERY

NO.

GOLD MEDAL, FLOUR

NO.

LIFE SAVERS, MINT CANDIES

NO.

SHERWIN-WILLIAMS, PAINT

NO.

GILLETTE, RAZORS

NO.

SINGER, SEWING MACHINES

NO.

COCA-COLA, SOFT DRINKS

NO.

CAMPBELLS, SOUP

NO.

IVORY, SOAP

NO.

SOURCE ADVERTISING AGE

Brand Character

Nowadays, when probed deeply, consumers de-
scribe the products they call brands in terms that wewould normally expect to be used to describe people.They tell us that brands can be warm or friendly; coldor modern; old-fashioned; romantic; practical; sophis-ticated; stylish and so on.

They talk about a brands persona, its image and its
reputationand this aura or ethos is what charac-terizes a brand.

It follows that all brands, like all people, have a
personality of one kind or another. But like thestrongest individuals, the strongest brands have morethan mere personalitythey have charactermoredepth, more integrity, they stand out from the crowd.

Note the importance that one major marketer at-
taches to this concept.

My acid test on the issue is whether a housewife in-tending to buy Heinz Tomato Ketchup in a store,finding it to be out of stock, will walk out of the storeto buy it elsewhere or switch to an alternative prod-uct.

A. J. OREILLY

PRESIDENT & CEO, H.J. HEINZ This explains why the best marketers try to develop
powerful brand characters. They make them less vul-nerable in the market-place. They help a higher qualityproduct to be perceived as such by consumers.

Today, the establishment of such strong and en-
during brands is rather more difficult.

Static populations mean static markets which meansincreased competition for market share.

Product quality is converging, with increasingtechnological parity among major marketers.

The influence of the retailer and retailers own storebrands is growing in many parts of the world.

Marketing expenses are growing, as manufacturersrespond to the ever-higher cost of reaching the con-sumer.All in all, the pressures on manufacturers brands
are immense.

Superior Product Quality

Serious marketers know that in the face of these
pressures the success of their brands can only rest onsuperior product quality.

They know that as the consumer views more prod-
ucts as commodities, it becomes harder to establish ameaningful point of difference for their products. Theyknow that clever marketing and promotion of cosmeticdifferences cannot paper over this.

They know that the longevity of their brands is helped
by good marketing, but is founded on superior productperformance and this in turn is founded on their ability toproduce a

higher quality product at a lower cost.

Which is why market leaders priorities are now fo-
cusing on a common objective which was not amongtheir priorities in previous decadesto work dili-gently to be the

low-cost producer

in their market.

Low costs provide the means to achieve that happi-
est of all situationshigher product quality... fewerprice increases... and more advertising.

Low costs are the priority as a sound base for all the
other steps needed to build growth.

Thus, the competitive intensity of maturing pack-
aged goods markets around the world has brought tothe fore the economic logic of world brands

the oppor-

tunity for international economies of scale as the basis oflong-term strategic security.

Today, the most thoughtful companies are adopting
a new approach to international marketing.

These companies are moving through the five basic
stages in the life of a multinational corporation as seenin the chart below.

And as they pass through stages 4 and 5 the need
for pan-regional and world marketing is emerging atthe heart of their business strategy.

The globalization of markets is at hand. With that,the multinational commercial world nears its end, andso does the multinational corporation.The global corporation operates as if the entire world(or major regions of it) were a single entity; it sells thesame things in the same way everywhere.Corporations geared to this new reality can decimatecompetitors that still live in the disabling grip of oldassumptions about how the world works.

PROFESSOR THEODORE LEVITT

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

A New Approach

After the vicissitudes of the 1950s and 1960s, more
companies are now reaching the status of havingacquired critical mass in various regions of the world.They are now starting to turn from primary concernabout return on acquisition investment andoverhead recovery towards getting to grips withlong-term franchise building across each world region.

At the same time the progressive harmonization of
headquarters and local management culture andstyle, evolving from more frequent two-way move-ment of personnel, is enhancing the likelihood ofsuccessful adoption and execution of pan-regionalbusiness strategies.

And meanwhile in Europe, managements strategic
thinking is beginning to broaden to match the dimen-sions of the Common Market as legislative harmoniza-tion focuses attention on pan-European issues.

International Growth Priority

Companies have passed through the bygone age
when many of them treated Overseas Division as thepoor cousin of the organisation, struggling to competein foreign markets with strongly established indige-nous competitors.

The international divisions of many companies are
now beginning to come of age and receive their right-ful allocation of corporate resource, if only for thepractical reason that corporate earnings growth inmany multinationals is today often provided by non-domestic markets.

Business System Economics

The strategic value of pan-regional branding lies in
the scale economies it affords across the companysbusiness systemto help make the company the low-cost producer.

Where the economies arise will vary by product
category, and may include research and development,materials purchasing, manufacturing, distribution andadvertising

The optimum business system for a European beer,
for example, is markedly different to that for chewinggum, but the principle is the same. Secure, franchise-protected volumes at the regional scale can allow acompany to

build a price/cost/value structure which will

eventually put it out of reach of competition.

All these factors set the conceptual framework
within which a truly pan-regional brand can exist inthe years ahead. The international need is the startingpoint. Research will be conducted to look for marketsimilarities between countries, not to seek out differ-ences. Similarities will be the new fuel for growth.

The creative process will still be as vital as ever,
marketers in each location will still be dependent onthe intuitive creative judgement of locally based crea-tive management, but this effort will be marshalled toa single-minded overall advertising strategy.

Marketing Learning Curve

There is then a real marketing learning curve that
allows the progressive refinement of a success for-mula, as the pan-regional brands broaden their experi-ence country by country.

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie University from March 2014 to September 2014.

585-014 -15-

(continued)

The best creative brains are given an opportunity to
develop advertising for an entire region of the world,and not simply for one marketto find a real adver-tising idea

so deep in its appeal

that it can transcend

national borders previously thought inviolate.

Consumer Convergence

In the past, the successes in world branding have
been few, and have been achieved by virtue of thesheer will and far-sighted commitment of manage-ments who stayed consistently with a long-term visionfor the business. Procter & Gamble is a company inthis category that comes to mind.

In the future, the only winners in cross-country
branding will be companies who have seen that socialdevelopments are making redundant the old idea thatdifferences between nations are decisive in framingmarketing strategy.

The most advanced manufacturers are recognising
that there are probably more social differences be-tween Midtown Manhattan and the Bronx, two sectorsof the same city, than between Midtown Manhattanand the 7th Arrondissement of Paris. This means thatwhen a manufacturer contemplates expansion of hisbusiness, consumer similarities in demography andhabits rather than geographic proximity will increas-ingly affect his decisions.

Demographic Convergence

Trends of vast significance to consumer marketing
such as ageing populations, falling birth rates, andincreased female employment are common to largesegments of the modern industrial world.

Consumer convergence in demography, habits and
culture is increasingly leading manufacturers to aconsumer-driven rather than a geography-driven viewof their marketing territory.

MARRIED COUPLES

OTHERS MARRIED COUPLES

OTHERS

1970 29%

36% 64%

71%

29%

39% 61%

71%

UK

DECLINE OF THE FAMILY UNIT

USA

SOURCE CSO US ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS
Decline of the Nuclear Family

Some of the most telling developments spring from the
same sourcethe decline of the nuclear family. Observershave attributed this to various causesthe rapid pace oftechnological development; higher labour productivitywhich reduces hours of work; and other more metaphysi-cal notions such as the emergence of a liberal philosophy,which increasingly recognizes that a womans role can existoutside the home.

Whatever the causes, the effects in terms of house-
hold composition have been dramatic. There are nowless children per household, and a declining propor-tion of households which conform to the two-adult-two-children pattern.

The result is the erosion of the traditional family
unit and its clarity of role and relationship. The effectshave been illustrated by the decline of formal meal-taking and the corresponding increase in the sales ofinstant and convenience foods. The multinationalexpansion of fast-food franchises like McDonalds isanother manifestation of the same trend.

Changing Role of Women

The table below shows the change in the role of
women in the working population over the past dec-ade. The fact that the majority of women in most mod-ern societies now have a job requires a major adjust-ment to current ideas on communicating with a con-sumer group that no longer conforms to the home-centred stereotype of yesteryear.MORE WORKING WOMEN

% CHANGE 1970
WORKING
POPULATION

WORKINGWOMEN

USA

+ 24.

+ 37.

BELGIUM

+ 8.

+ 24.

NETHERLANDS

+ 10.

+ 24.

ITALY

+ 8.

+ 22.

FRANCE

+ 7.

+ 17.

UK

+4.

+ 15.

GERMANY

+ 3.

SOURCE EUROSTAT

Associated with this change, there has been a well
documented trend to lower marriage rates and higherdivorce rates. This trend has led one group of socialscientists to invent the phrase serial monogamy todescribe what they forecast to be the nature of rela-tionships in the 1980s and beyond. They suggest thatthere will be an increasing tendency for couples to livetogether for a number of years, then to change theirpartners and set up home afresh, changing again aftera few years, and so on. This discontinuity in formalrelationships, especially where children are involvedand re-marriages occur, will have profound effects onfamily relationships.

MORE DIVORCES, LESS MARRIAGES(1970100) 240 220200 180 160140120 10080 60 40

DIVORCESMARRIAGES

USA

BELGIUM

UK

FRANCE

JAPAN

GERMANY

NETHS.

SOURCE EUROMONITOR

Static Populations

Population growth is now almost zero in the west-
ern world. All modern industrial countries are forecastto produce population growth of much less than 1%per annum over the next 20 years. It is hardly surpris-ing that within this static population, the age structureis undergoing a transformation. The over 65s are agrowing group relative to the 25-65s, and that group isgrowing relative to the fourteen and unders.STATIC POPULATIONS

% GROWTH PER ANNUM1960

19802000ESTIMATE

AUSTRALIA

2.

0 8

CANADA

1 8

0 8

USA

0.

SPAIN

1 1

0.

JAPAN

1.

0.

FRANCE

1.

0.

ITALY

0.

0 3

UK

0.

0.

GERMANY

0.

0.

SOURCE: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT

ORGANISATIONAL PROGRESS TO WORLD BRANDS

COMPANYSTARTS TO
OPERATE IN ITS

OWN
COUNTRY

STARTSTO EXPORT

OPENS
MARKETINGCOMPANIES
OVERSEAS WITH

THEIR OWN
MANUFACTURING

PLANT

COORDINATESMARKETING ANDPRODUCTION

ACROSSDIFERENTCOUNTRIES

CENTRALIZESPRODUCTION/DISTRIBUTION/MARKETING BYCONTINENT

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

ECONOMIC PROGRESS TO WORLD BRANDS

PRESSURE OF

COST
INFLATION INSTATIC MARKETS

NEED TO BELOW COSTPRODUCER TOWIN MARKETSHARE BATTLE

SEARCH FOR
MORE EFFICIENT

BUSINESSSTRUCTURE

ECONOMIESOF SCALE

WORLDBRANDS

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie University from March 2014 to September 2014.

585-014 -16-

(continued)

Higher Living Standards

In most western countries, improvements in the ma-
terial standard of life have resulted in a growing de-mand for consumer durables and for more leisure.This is reinforced by shorter working weeks that ac-company technological progress and productivitygrowth.

The entry of women into the labour market itself
creates a demand for consumer durables to ease thestrain of keeping house.HIGHER LIVING STANDARDS

GROWTH IN REAL PERSONAL

CONSUMPTION 1970

USA

+ 42%

UK

+ 26%

FRANCE

+ 60%

GERMANY

+ 34%

JAPAN

+ 65%

Cultural Convergence

At the same time as demography is converging,
television and motion pictures are creating elements ofshared culture. And this cultural convergence is facili-tating the establishment of multinational brand charac-ters. The worldwide proliferation of the Marlborobrand would not have been possible without TV andmotion picture education about the virile ruggedcharacter of the American West and the Americancowboyhelped by increasing colour TV penetrationin all countries.

Observers believe that cultural convergence will
proceed at an accelerated rate through the next dec-adeparticularly with the deployment of L-SAT high-power TV satellites throughout Europe.

EUROPES NEW SUPER STATIONS UNITED KINGDOM

LUXEMBOURG

GERMANY SWITZERLANDITALY

FRANCE

These developments will reduce cultural barriers ascountries exchange their media output through satel-lite networksfor the first time allowing viewers freeraccess to international television without the barrier oflanguage.

Marketing Timetables

Analysis of all these demographic, cultural, and
media trends is allowing manufacturers to definemarket expansion timetables. Essentially, marketerswill be tracking trends which indicate when a region isready for attack via programmes they have testedelsewhere.

For example, current changes in European laundry
practices were foreshadowed by similar trends in theUS during the fate 60s and early 70s. Thus a USmanufacturer of low-suds detergent would examinethe growth in the penetration of front-loading washingmachines in the UK to assess the ripening potential forhis own product.

MARKET EXPANSION TIMETABLES% OF HOUSEHOLDS OWNING FRONT LOADING WASHING MACHINES

SOURCE COMPANY RESEARCH

50 20

40 30 Consider also Europes soap powder manufacturers.
Driven by improved washing machine technology andthe increased popularity of relatively fragile syntheticand coloured fabrics, European laundry habits haveconverged Every major nation now washes a majorityof its wash loads in under 60C water. This has createda common need for a product which performs wellunder these circumstances.

The result has been the marketing of single brands
with a common brand name. product formulation, andpositioning across the whole of Europe.

In the future, the only winners in cross-country
branding will be companies who do a lot of thingsright and synthesise their efforts effectively aroundthree golden rules:1. To market clearly differentiated products that

either drive, or capitalize on, real convergences inconsumer habits and tastes.

To create a dedicated management value system

that mirrors the vision of a pan-regional brandedbusiness.

To monitor their brands character on a consistent,

continuous, comparable basis across geographyand over time.The opportunity for world brands is there to be
siezed but only for those companies with the long-

term determination to meet these stringent require-ments.

Here are two other examples of the global approach
in actionfor British Airways and Procter & GamblesPampers. The Pampers brand was introduced in theUS in the late 1960s. Pampers created the disposablediaper market by providing a product that was moreconvenient and more absorbent than cloth diapers at aprice consumers were willing to pay. Pampers is nowProcter & Gambles largest brand and is sold on asimilar strategy almost all over the world. If the Pam-pers business was a separate company, it would rankin the top one-third of the Fortune 500 list.

Does a global advertising campaign have to be
bland? Not according to the South China Morning Postwhich described B.A.s new worldwide campaign as unique and imaginative

; or the Sydney Morning Her-

ald

a radical departure from the usual formula;

or

Newsweek

a tour de force;

or the Wall Street Jour-

nal

the most ambitious attempt so far... to use a one

world campaign

; or the London Sunday Times

flash of inspiration.

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie University from March 2014 to September 2014.

585-014 -17-

The Agency is now working on a similar exercise on
Silk Cut for American Brands/Gallahera Companywhose marketing was recently described by the Finan-cial Times as

an object lesson for its competitors on the

rewards of brand discipline.

Impact on Agency Structure

What are the implications of these trends for the ad-
vertising industry?

Business service companies, such as agencies, bene-
fit from the increasing complexity of problems in theirareas of expertise. Knowledge has value, and there is agreater value-added during periods of turmoil andchange in the business environment.

Most observers believe that the trend to pan-
regional or global marketing will have a marked im-pact on the structure of advertising agencies... becauseworld brands require world agencies.

A HANDFUL OF WORLDWIDEAGENCY NETWORKS WILL
HANDLE THE BULK OF $125 bn
WORLD ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE

FOR MAJOR MULTINATIONALS.

Many expect to see the advertising industry moving
in the same direction as accounting, banking, financialservices, etca polarization between worldwide net-works servicing global corporations, and strong localfirms handling domestic clients in their own country.

SOME OF THE AGENCYS CLIENTSIN 3 OR MORE COUNTRIESALLIED LYONS

IBM

AMERICAN BRANDS

JOHNSON & JOHNSON

AMERICAN MOTORS

NABISCO BRANDS

AVIS

NESTLE

BLACK & DECKER

PEPSICO

BRITISH AIRWAYS

PROCTER & GAMBLE

BSN-GERVAIS DANONE

PLAYTEX

CADBURY SCHWEPPES

ROWNTREE MACKINTOSH

CHESEBROUGH-PONDS TIMEXDU PONT

UNITED BISCUITS

This is pleasant for the business prospects of those
agencies who can serve this global requirement, butleaves open one important questionwhether thistrend will result in

better

advertising? On this question

opinions differ.

Some agency managers are fond of saying that they
would rather operate a solid, disciplined internationalnetwork than run the best creative agency in theworld.

Meantime, others declare that they would rather
have high creative standards than succumb to thearthritis of international management structures.

Both these viewpoints ignore the possibility of com-
bining discipline and creativity in one internationalorganisation. This is because is it hard to do.

IN 1982,

OUR UK AGENCY WON MORE
TOP UK ADVERTISING AWARDSTHAN ALL THE OTHER MAJOR

MULTINATIONAL AGENCIES

PUT TOGETHER.

SOURCE: GOLD AND SILVER AWARDS IN THE
CAMPAIGN PRESS AWARDS, D&AD, AND BRITISH

TELEVISION ADVERTISING AWARDS

The Company has always aimed to create

the one

type of agency which has somehow eluded the grasp of thosefew men and women who have tried to achieve it

a large

agency, certainly, with all the stability that gives toemployees, and all the backup that provides for cli-entsbut one which at the same time also succeeds inbeing progressive, youthful and innovative in ap-proach.

The fact that this combination has so rarely been
achieved in our industry increases the sense of pur-pose with which we continue to pursue it as our goal.

This has been the fundamental spur to our growth
over the years.

HIGH CREATIVITY

ACROSS A DISCIPLINED

WORLD NETWORK.

THE COMPANYS CONSISTENT

STRATEGIC GOAL.

Last month Saatchi & Saatchi Company PLC, the
parent company of the worldwide agency network,announced its results for the year ended September30th 1983. It was the Companys 13th successiveyear of profit growth. In the year pre-tax profits roseby 103%, earnings per share by 40%. dividends pershare by 45%.

Over the last five years the Company has shown a
compound average growth of 43% in pre-tax profits,33% for earnings per share, and 37% for dividendsper share.

If you would like a copy of the Chairmans State-
ment on these results please write to the CompanySecretary, Saatchi & Saatchi Company PLC, at 80Charlotte Street, London W1A 1AQ, or 625 MadisonAvenue, New Yolk, New York 10022.

####### SAATCHI & SAATCHI

####### COMPTON WORLDWIDE.

Mexico

Jamaica

Barbados

Puerto Rico

Canada

USA

Bermuda

Portugal

Ireland

Spain

UK

France

Norway

Sweden

Finland

Denmark
Netherlands

Belgium

Germany

Switzerland

Austria

Italy

S. Africa
Greece

Columbia

Peru
Venezuela

Trinidad

Chile

Argentina

Brazil

Australia

Malaysia

Singapore

Thailand

Philippines

Hong Kong

Japan

65 OFFICES IN 38 COUNTRIES. THE UK AGENCY WORKS WITH 6 OF

BRITAINS TOP 10 ADVERTISERS

THE US AGENCY HANDLES MORE No. 1 BRANDS

THAN ANY OTHER AGENCY IN AMERICA

THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK WORKS WITH44 OF THE WORLDS TOP 200 ADVERTISERS

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie University from March 2014 to September 2014.

Exhibit 5

Manhattan Landing Storyboard

585-014 -18-

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie University from March 2014 to September 2014.

Exhibit 6

Casablanca Preference Campaign Storyboard

585-014 -19-

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie University from March 2014 to September 2014.

585-014 British Airways

Exhibit 7 BA Concept and Tactical Advertising Budgets: Initial 1983-84 Plan (000)

Concept Campaign

April-September October-March Total

Tactical
Campaigns Row Total

United Kingdom 4,700 1,200 5,900 3,200 9,

U.S.A. 2,600 750 3,350 2,450 5,

Germany 450 450 900 607 1,

Australia 500 100 600 350 950

France 150 200 350 269 619

Japan/Korea 200 70 270 400 670

Gulf States 0 35 35 190 225

Canada 900 200 1,100 400 1,

South Africa 300 75 375 250 625

Italy 150 100 250 225 475

New Zealand 100 0 100 100 200

Egypt 50 0 50 30 80

Zimbabwe 32 0 32 25 57

Trinidad 18 0 18 27 45

Other NA NA 860 3,

a
4,

Total 10,150 3,180 14,190 11,743 25,

a Includes contingency fund

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

British Airways 585-014

Exhibit 8 Media Budget and Schedule of the British Airways Concept/Brand Campaign in the

United States ($ in millions)

April-June 1983 September-October 1983

Spots Expenditures # Spots Expenditures

Spot television (in 6 gateway markets)

a
686 $2,900 175 $572

Network television

b
4 1,040 --- --

Cable television 40 104 25 58

730 $4,044 200 $630

Reach/Frequency

Gateway cities 86%/8.7 times 63%/3.3 times

Remainder of United States 45%/1.2 times —

Audience Composition % of Those Reached Index

Adult men 48 102

Adult women 52 99

Age 25-54 73 137

Household income $30,000+ 47 169

a New York, Washington, Boston, Miami, Chicago, and Los Angeles.

b Only the Manhattan Landing execution was shown on network television. It was targeted at the 78% of U.S.

households not reached by the spot television advertising.

c Each index figure represents the percentage degree to which the audience reached included more or fewer

people than the U.S. population at large.

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

Exhibit 9 BA Business Campaign Magazine Advertisement

585-014 British Airways

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

Exhibit 10 TWA Business Segment Magazine Advertisement

British Airways 585-014

23
This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

585-014 -24-

Exhibit 11

Media Budget and Schedule of the British Airways Business Campaign in the United States ($ millions)

December 1982-March 1983

April-June 1983

September -October 1983

Insertions

Expenditures

Insertions

Expenditures

Insertions

Expenditures

22 magazines

$121

$745

$674

3 newspapers (

Wall Street Journal

New York Times

L.A. Times

)

563

371

276

$684

$1,116

$950

Reach/Frequency: Men 25-54Gateway cities

73%/7.4 times

65%/5.4 times

Remainder of United States

67%/6.3 times

55%/3.5 times

Audience Composition

% Reach to ThosePlanning ForeignTravel for Business

Index

Adult men

147

Age 25-54

126

Attended/graduated college

197

Household income $35,000+

284

aNo insertions prior to February 1983bFigures for December 1982 through June 1983cIn 1982-83, about 10% of transatlantic business travelers were women.

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie University from March 2014 to September 2014.

Exhibit 12 BA Leisure Segment Print Advertisement

British Airways 585-014

25
This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie

Exhibit 13

Pan AM Leisure Segment Print Advertisement

585-014 -26-

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie University from March 2014 to September 2014.

585-014 -27-

Exhibit 14

Media Budget and Schedule of the British Airways Leisure Campaign in the United States ($ in millions)

December 1982-March 1983

April-June 1983

September -October 1983

of Spots,Insertions

Expenditures

$ of Spots,Insertions

Expenditures

of Spots,Insertions

Expenditures

Spot television (10 markets)

—

450

$795

—

Local newspapers (11 markets)

3-4/market

$641

3-7/market

620

4-6/market

$550

Reach/FrequencyAverage market

40%/2.0 times

75%/5.0 times

47%/2.9 times

Audience Composition

% Reach to Those Planning a

Foreign Vacation

Index

Adult men

Adult women

105

Age 25-54

114

Household income $30,000+

175

This document is authorized for use only in Marketing Management S1, 2014 by Prof Scott Koslow at Macquarie University from March 2014 to September 2014.

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商科essay/report/assignments/paper/research/summary代写-Business

Harvard Business School 9-585-

British Airways

THE OPPORTUNITY FOR WORLD BRANDS.

65 OFFICES IN 38 COUNTRIES. THE UK AGENCY WORKS WITH 6 OF

BRITAINS TOP 10 ADVERTISERS

THE US AGENCY HANDLES MORE No. 1 BRANDS

THAN ANY OTHER AGENCY IN AMERICA

THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK WORKS WITH44 OF THE WORLDS TOP 200 ADVERTISERS

Spots Expenditures # Spots Expenditures

Insertions

Insertions

Insertions

of Spots,Insertions

of Spots,Insertions

发表回复取消回复

Harvard Business School 9-585-

British Airways

THE OPPORTUNITY FOR WORLD BRANDS.

65 OFFICES IN 38 COUNTRIES. THE UK AGENCY WORKS WITH 6 OF

BRITAINS TOP 10 ADVERTISERS

THE US AGENCY HANDLES MORE No. 1 BRANDS

THAN ANY OTHER AGENCY IN AMERICA

THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK WORKS WITH44 OF THE WORLDS TOP 200 ADVERTISERS

Spots Expenditures # Spots Expenditures

Insertions

Insertions

Insertions

of Spots,Insertions

of Spots,Insertions

发表回复 取消回复

发表回复取消回复